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Postmodernist Architectures 
in the Law of Religion 
Ruti G. Teitel* 
What do I mean by postmodernist architectures in the law 
of religion?' Postmodernism refers to the contemporary status 
of the study of knowledge. It is characterized by a transcending 
of the terms of the modern period; yet the paradox of the 
postmodern is its coincident response to the m ~ d e r n . ~  Just  as  
the term "postcommunism" encompasses a response to 
communism, and just as we search for a political identity 
beyond opposition to communism, so too we grope for a cultural 
identity beyond the modern. In  a graphic way the terms remind 
us of the extent to which meaning derives from context-here 
from an oppositional   on text.^ 
What, then, characterizes a postmodernist perspective on 
the law of religion? Across disciplines, a postmodemist 
* Associate Professor, New York Law School. 
1. In this Essay I claim architectural metaphors dominate writing in the law 
of religion. These metaphors are the graphic manifestations of contemporary 
conceptions about the relation of religion to public life. 
The clearest place to start in examining the relationship between 
modernism and postmodernism is in architecture. This may be because 
architecture, though closely concerned with all the debates about 
modernism and modernity of this century, is an area of cultural practice 
in which movements and stylistic dominants are much more conspicuous 
and less arguable than elsewhere . . . . 
STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERNIST CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY 66 (1989). 
2. See Andreas Huyssen, Mapping the Postmoden, in  CULTURE AND SOCIETY: 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 355, 355 (Jefiey C. Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 
1990) ("The term 'postmodernism' itself should guard us . . . as it positions the 
phenomenon as relational. Modernism as that from which postmodernism is 
breaking away remains inscribed into the very word with which we describe our 
distance from modernism."). 
3. See ERNE~TO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST 
STRATEGY: TOWARDS A RADICAL DEMOCRATIC PoL~TICS (Winston Moore & Paul 
Cammack trans., 1985). 
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approach implies an understanding of indeterminacy. All is 
inter~retat ion.~ In the theorizing of constitutional law we were 
latecomers to the issue, yet the past decade's debate over 
constitutional interpretation frames the question: To what 
extent, as an interpretive community, have we shifted 
paradigms from adherence to the notion of ostensibly neutral 
foundational principles to acknowledging and even embracing 
indeterminate, multiple perspectives to constitutional 
interpretati~n?~ In rejecting totalizing narratives, and in 
embracing contextual narratives, recent critical challenges to 
the approaches to legal interpretation, from race and feminist 
theory in particular,B proceed in postmodernist fashion. 
What is there beyond indeterminacy? The postmodernist 
challenge to a unitary view seems logically to lead to 
propounding a principle of pluralism.' "Post-modernism means 
the end of a single world view and . . . 'a war on totality', a 
resistance to single explanations, a respect for difference and a 
celebration of the regional, local, and particular."' 
Yet conversely and intriguingly, the logic of postmodernism 
also leads away from pluralism, and backwards and forwards 
to universalism. In incorporating the new technology with its 
radical increase in communication, postmodemism implies 
interconnectedness and movement away from pluralism toward 
syncretic and universalist norms.' 
The paradox of the postmodern is its embrace of these 
seemingly conflicting principles of plural ism a n d  
~niversalism.'~ I introduce the postmodern paradox here 
4. See RICHARD ROFt'lY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). 
5.  Compare Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971), with Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An 
Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1137 (1983). 
6. See Joel F. Handler, The Presidential Address, 1992: Postmodernism, Protest, 
and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 697 (1992). 
7. See Charles Jencks, The Post-Modern Agenda, in THE POST-MODERN READER 
10, 11 (Charles Jencks ed., 1992) ("pluralism is the leading 'ism' of post- 
modernity"). 
8. Id. 
9. In postmodernist theorizing, the pluralist strain is widely recognized, but 
not so the universalist strain. An exception is architectural theory. Postmodernism's 
potential for universalism lies in its aggressive deconstruction (destruction) and 
recombination of both traditions. In this Essay, I argue these two seemingly 
opposite directions are manifest in contemporary manifestations of the relation of 
religion to public life. See Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the 
Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993). 
10. The universalist direction is seen in theorizing in theology such as in 
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because these apparently opposing aspects are clearly seen in 
contemporary developments in the law of religion. 
To what extent are these two apparently conflicting aspects 
of the postmodernist paradox evinced in religion in public life? 
Much of postmodernist critique implies recognition of limits to 
the Enlightenment narrative about knowledge. Perhaps the 
brightest line in the Enlightenment account was the line 
demarcating faith and reason.'' Whether in political or 
constitutional theory, the rethinking of the Enlightenment 
narrative has an impact on our thinking about the role of 
- 
religion in public life. 
The contemporary shift to  a postmodernist paradigm 
implies a challenge to  prevailing constitutional discourse. The 
rejection of modernism's dualisms is seen in the changing 
vocabulary of the First Amendment Religion Clause 
jurispmdence. 
This Essay's title refers to the language and, in particular, 
to the organizing metaphors we have been using in our 
discussion of the constitutional law of religion. Postmodernism 
invites us to analyze the language we have been using to 
account for religion. The title suggests a shitt in the metaphors 
used to describe the relation of the law to  religion. Let us 
analyze the rhetoric of the prevailing jurisprudence from a 
postmodernist perspective. Postmodernism rejects the notion of 
a fixed connotation of meaning outside language in its context. 
Accordingly, the significance of the Religion Clause 
jurisprudence is illuminated by analysis of the words in context 
and, in particular, by analysis of the pervasive oppositional 
pairs that are modernism's legacy. 
The Enlightenment's "foundational" oppositional pair are 
religion and reason. The postmodernist critique of the rhetoric 
of the law of religion challenges this distinction, highlighting 
areas of epistemological overlap. Dualisms pervade the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses. The 
liberation theology, in particular in the work of Harvey Cox and David Griffin. See 
generdy IiARVEY COX, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CJTY: TOWARD A POSTMODERN 
THEOLOGY (1984); DAVID R. GRIFFIN, GOD AND RELIGION IN THE POSTMODERN 
WORLD: ESSAYS IN POSTMODERN THEOLOGY (1988). 
11. For an account, see generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A 
STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981). 
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division of the Religion Clause doctrine into two sides, 
subjective and objective, reinforces the modernist parameters to 
the law of religion. Other oppositional pairs are church and 
state, religion and politics, religion and science, sectarianism 
and secularism, the individual and the community, and the 
private and the public spheres. Perhaps the sigdicance of each 
element of the pairs derives from its place in the pair. 
The First Amendment Establishment Clause concerns 
relating religion to public and private institutions, while the 
First Amendment Free Exercise Clause concerns the impact of 
the law on the personal. The doctrine of the two clauses is 
thoroughly oppositional. The Establishment Clause doctrine 
encompasses the law concerning the organized aspect of the 
law of religion: What constitutional principles guide the 
relations of our societal institutions-the church and the state? 
Just as the term suggests, "free exercise" doctrine instead 
describes the constitutional law relating to the individual and 
her conscience. 
Under the Establishment Clause doctrine, the Court has 
asked: To what extent does the state's action have the effect of 
advancing religion? How ought this be gauged; how does one 
measure effect? A majority of the Court has said the proper 
perspective is that of the "reasonable observer."12 Thus, the 
Establishment Clause inquiry sets out to  be "objective" in 
nature. 
Under the Free Exercise Clause doctrine, in contrast, the 
Court has asked: To what extent has the government's policy 
impacted on the individual's ability to practice her religion? On 
this side of the constitutional doctrine, the inquiry becomes 
subjective. What is relevant, the Court has said, is the effect of 
the government's action, not for a hypothetical or idealized 
"reasonable observer," but instead for the particular 
petitioner.13 
Establishment doctrine offers a purportedly objective 
approach to assessing the impact actions of the state have on 
religion. Free exercise doctrine offers a subjective, individuated 
approach. The two doctrines appeared to proceed on parallel 
12. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989) (opinion 
of Blackmun, J.) (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 
U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Co~or, J., concurring)). 
13. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the right of 
Amish children to an exemption from state mandatory school attendance laws). 
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tracks, occasioning critique in legal academic scholarship for 
the apparent absence of a coherent conception of religious 
constitutional rights. l4 
Yet from a postmodernist perspective, whatever coherence 
there may be in the church-state doctrine derives precisely 
from its oppositional nature. What enabled the continuity of 
the constitutional law of religion were its arguably dichotomous 
principles. The close connection between the two sides of the 
church-state doctrine is evidenced in the contemporary 
challenge to the doctrine. If there is a connection between the 
two sides of the doctrine, as we would expect, the critique of 
doctrine under either clause would often imply the critique of 
both? 
The division of the Religion Clause doctrine into two sides, 
subjective and objective, reinforces the Religion Clause 
jurisprudence's modernist underpinnings. The shadow cast by 
t h e  m e t a p h o r  of " t h e  wal ln- i t s  a l l u s i o n  t o  
separation-dominates the area. And the development of the 
law of religion in turn affected the religious sector's own 
understanding of the boundaries of its legitimate role in the 
public sphere. 
The contemporary shift to  a postmodernist paradigm and 
its rejection of modernist dichotomies implies a change in the 
vocabulary of the Religion Clause jurisprudence. My claim is 
that there has been a significant change in the metaphors 
used, both in the jurisprudence and in the scholarly writing of 
the law of religion. Outside the law, the paradigm shift can 
also be seen where there is a change in the way we talk about 
values in culture. 
The organizing metaphor of the "wall of separation" has 
given way to the metaphor of the "public square." What does 
the change signify? Let us begin with the metaphor of the "wall 
of separation." A wall has two sides; a wall expresses a 
dualism. What does it divide? What is included? What is 
excluded? What is included and what is excluded is determined 
by the various communities which situate themselves on either 
side of the wall.16 In a now classical work on American 
14. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: 
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PPIT. L. REV. 673 (1980). 
15. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSZTTUTIONAL LAW 247-56 (1988). 
16. Even in early American constitutional thought, at least three distinct 
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religious life, Mark Howe characterized the wall as that  which 
separated the "garden" from the "wilderne~s."'~ But whose 
garden? Whose wilderness? For believers, the garden was 
clearly the place of belief, and the wall was its legal protection. 
For nonbelievers the converse was true. The wall's significance 
is a function of context, of place and/or perspective.18 
The metaphor of the wall has also long dominated our 
political theory, separating our political world into communist 
and liberal democratic-enslaved and free. With the 
destruction of the political wall, an attack has also been 
launched on the wall dividing secular and sacred. Challenges 
emanate from various directions: there is the broad 
postmodernist attack on modernism; from legal academia, there 
is the claim of how stripped-down the doctrine of the wall; from 
the faith communities, there are claims about how barren the 
religious landscape. 
The wall as the leading metaphor for religion in public life 
is now giving way to the public square. For some time the 
image of the public square has dominated scholarly writing in 
the area. In  legal writing, it appears in the work of Michael 
Perry.lg In theological writing, i t  appears in The Williamsburg 
conceptions of the wall emerged: those of Roger Williams, Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison. For Roger Williams, the wall served to protect the churches and 
religious freedom more generally. For Thomas Jefferson, the function of the wall 
was to protect the state. And for James Madison, the wall served a dual function 
of simultaneously separating and protecting the church and the state from each 
other. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816-17 (1978). 
In his treatise, Tribe offers these three conceptions and argues that the three 
apparently diverging conceptions actually converge upon principles of voluntarism 
and separatism. Id. at 818. Yet perhaps notwithstandihg. Tribe's claim, what is 
intriguing about the metaphor of the wall is its capacity to accommodate so many 
diverging conceptions of the relation of law to religion, arguably precisely because 
of the wall as metaphor's minimalism. 
17. MARK D. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN C O N ~ I O N A L  HISTORY (1965). 
18. The doctrine of the wall is exemplified under the Establishment Clause, see, 
e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (barring prayer in the public schools, 
the Court declared the Establishment Clause's "first and most immediate purpose 
rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and to  degrade religionn). 
For an illustration under the free exercise side of the First Amendment 
doctrine, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the right of 
Amish children to an exemption from state mandatory school attendance laws). 
Read together, Engel and Yoder delineate the parameters of the wall. From one 
side of the wall, Engel said religious activities must be kept separate from public 
institutions; from the other side of the wall, Yoder said religions must be permitted 
to thrive, free of secular control on the side of the divide. 
19. See generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION 
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Charter, a document authored by a group of religious and 
political leaders offering a consensus statement on what 
principles ought to govern. religion in public life.20 Reverend 
Richard Neuhaus' The Naked Public Square2' is redolent 
postmodernist imagery. If the "naked" is the "private," 
Neuhaus calls for the "private" in "public." If the "naked" is the 
"vacant," Neuhaus calls for the "fleshing 
As an architectural form, what is comprehended by the 
public square? In the postmodernist critique of architectural 
theory, the line has shifted away from abstraction and 
minimalism, toward architecture with a narrative.23 It is a 
move toward representation. Unlike a wall's simple two- 
sidedness, a square circumscribes an area. In architecture, a 
public square defines a common area, one with the potential for 
shared use by the community. 
What does the popularity of this architectural metaphor 
tell us about the contemporary understanding of the part of 
religion in public life? I believe the metaphor of the "public 
square" evokes a rich conception of culture surfacing in 
contemporary controversies over the public sphere. The turn to 
the term suggests that prior separationist principles embodied 
in the doctrine of the wall could not account for the 
development of a third space. The third space is the enormous 
growth in public culture. The "public square," therefore, is not 
public in the sense we have been using it  in the law for the last 
forty years, not public in the sense of governmental, and not 
public in the sense ordinarily juxtaposed to private or 
individual. It is a sense of public in the architectural sense. I t  
is an invented public, a representational public. It is a sense of 
the public as it appears in the many controversies over the 
AND MORALJTY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991). 
20. See THE WILLIAMSBURG CHARTER (1988), reprinted in, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 5 
(1990). 
21. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984). I introduce and discuss the convergence of these 
various developments in Teitel, supra note 9. 
22. See Teitel, supm note 9; NEUKAUS, supra note 21. See generally FIRST 
THINGS: A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE (see especially the 
monthly column entitled The Public Square: A Continuing Survey of Religion and 
Public Life by Richard J. Neuhaus). 
23. For a discussion of related developments in architecture theory, see 
Henreich Klotz, Postmodern Architecture, in THE POST-MODERN READER, supra note 
7, at 234, 241 ("the characteristic objective of postmodernism-to create an 
architecture of 'narrative contents' "). 
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uses of public education, public universities, the mass media, 
museums, parades-wherever we understand the public sphere 
to be. 
What is signified by the public square metaphor is 
illustrated in the crucible of the multiculturalism debate. 
Demands for equal recognition for gender, race, and sexual 
orientation in the public universities, the public schools, other 
public institutions, and public spaces, reveal a shared 
conceptualization of a public square in our society. What 
principles ought to govern this public square? In  the 
multiculturalism debate, the struggle has been waged over the 
"politics of re~ognition."~~ In that debate, the demand is for 
application of a principle of "equal re~ognition."~~ 
The claims raised in the multiculturalism debate, I 
contend, have been raised for some time in another arena-in 
controversies over church and state, religion and politics. I t  is 
strange that the multiculturalism debate has virtually excluded 
questions about religious orientation, when over time the 
question of reli@ous diversity has consistently challenged the 
conception and workings of our public sphere. 
III. ORIGINAL AND NEO-RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
For some time now, critical theory has challenged our 
thinking about the relationship between identity and law. In  
this regard, critical theory has proceeded from the perspective 
of race, gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientatioaz6 Strangely, 
critical theory work has not yet been explicitly recognized from 
the perspective of religious identity, nor is it the subject of 
contemporary scholarly controversy. The reason may lie in the 
comparatively longstanding nature of our religious pluralism. 
As distinguished from the much more recent public recognition 
of our racial and ethnic diversity, since the time of our 
founding extensive religious diversity has simply been a social 
fact of our national id en tit^.'^ In  America, religion is our fist 
24. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND 
"THE P o ~ I C S  OF RECOGNFTION" 25, 25-26 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992) (discussing 
"[tlhe need, sometimes the demand, for recognition"). 
25. In a larger work I explore this development as it relates to religion, and I 
term it a demand for "equal representation." See Teitel, supra note 9. 
26. , See, e.g., Handler, supm note 6. 
27. See Teitel, supm note 9. Of course, racial and ethnic diversity have been 
present since the founding, but the issue I am concerned about here is the nature 
of the public perception of American diversity. And with respect to this point 
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pluralism.28 Religious pluralism in America unquestionably 
predates the Constitution. 
Long before postmodernism's pluralism revival, there is a 
historical record of religious pluralism. The nature of our early 
religious pluralism is discussed in the works of public 
historians like Michael Kammen and Bernard Bailyn. Colonial 
rhetoric tells us something about the colonial understanding of 
the problems posed by religious pluralism. Religious 
multiplicity was simply accepted as a fact; the vital question 
was its scope, and its boundaries. The writing of the period 
reveals the profound challenge posed by the massive religious 
pluralism in colonial life. In American colonial life, religious 
diversity meant instability. Bernard Bailyn refers to the 
denominationalism of the time as "establishments of . . . 
i r reg~lar i ty ."~~ For the colonists, the issue was how much 
diversity and how much instability were socially tolerable. The 
"instability" was in the fluidity of religious fliliation-in the 
substantial movement between denominations. Michael 
Kammen characterizes the  diversity as  a n  "unstable 
pluralism."30 
The eighteenth century dilemma in church-state relations 
was to what extent to allow religious separatism, while 
maintaining a semblance of political stability. The urge to 
religious division was considered uncontrollable; its limiting 
principle was maintaining political union. 
Colonial discourse concerning religious multiplicity referred 
to the problem of religious affiliation. In this regard, the 
colonial rhetoric d i s t inguished  "sectarianism" a n d  
"den~minati~nali~m.~'  "Sectarianism" was considered a threat to 
the prevailing political order, while "denominationalism" was 
considered to be reconcilable with the local secular government. 
Our original religious pluralism informed our early 
political and constitutional theory. As in the colonial debates, 
the dilemma was how to preserve religious pluralism while 
maintaining some level of stability. An illustration of this 
alone, religious diversity was a unique aspect of colonial public culture. See 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 246-72 
(1967). 
28. The word the Framers used is "multiplicity," which appears to be the 
linguistic precursor to "pluralism." See Teitel, supra note 9. 
29. See BAILYN, supra note 27, at 249. 
30. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX: AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CMLIZATION 60 (1972). 
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debate is the federalist use of religious multiplicity as the 
touchstone for their reasoning about the  principles 
accommodating diversity in political ~pinion.~'  Just  as 
religious norms were thought better separated from public life, 
The Federalist No. 10 offers a somewhat negative view of 
multiplicity of religious opinion as "faction," and goes on to 
extend this view to political opinion. Yet The Federalist No. 10 
also offers a principle for political stability through political 
diversity. Many of t h e  Constitution's ins t i tut ional  
arrangements-federalism, a bicameral Congress, checks and 
balances-reflect this a~commodation.~~ 
In  the eighteenth century, America's broadest pluralism 
was religious pluralism. Today we can see this pluralism is 
original and yet enduring. Modernist principles enabled 
preservation of this pluralism, and they may yet be of guidance 
in the postmodernist revival. 
w. PARCELING UP THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
The multiculturalism debate suggests the way to best . 
protect cultural pluralism is to apply a principle of equal 
represen ta t i~n .~~ But what is meant by a principle of equal 
representation? What is the  aspiration: equality of 
representation outcome, or equality of opportunity to 
representation? Equality of opportunity or equality of access to 
representation in the public square cannot be equated with nor 
does i t  necessarily signify an equality-of-representation 
outcome. A postmodernist approach could lead in paradoxical 
directions to pluralist, but also to universalist, representations 
in the public sphere. Contemporary constitutional controversies 
illuminate these paradoxical aspects of the nature of religious 
identity represented in the public sphere. 
Unlike the wall, the public square conception contemplates 
some shared space. How is such space created? It is created a t  
the site of the wall's destruction. It is created by eviscerating 
the boundaries. How are the modernist boundaries destroyed? I 
contend constitutional litigation in the church-state area is 
being used to challenge the entrenched boundaries. 
Returning to our metaphors, the competition for equal 
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 131, 136 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright 
ed., 1961). 
32. See id. at 134-36. 
33. See Teitel, supra note 9. 
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representation in the square is vividly seen in the "equal 
access" debate over the public schools. I understand the equal 
access campaign for public-school prayer clubs as a demand for 
equal representation and legitimation of religion in the public 
sphere.34 A Supreme Court decision in the last Term neatly 
illustrates the phenomenon. Lamb's Chapel u. Center Moriches 
Union Free School D i s t r i ~ t ~ ~  involved a challenge by an 
evangelical church to school district rules barring the use of 
school facilities for religious purposes. 
Lamb's Chapel offers a wonderful postmodernist paradigm 
of the effort to  integrate religion in public culture. Once the 
case is reconceived as implying a controversy about equality of 
representation, the case offers rich manifold representational 
possibilities. Deconstructing the Lamb's Chapel opinion offers 
at least three layers of representational imagery in public 
culture. 
Perhaps the most obvious layer appears in the merits of 
the case. The controversy in the case directly implicates a 
question of representation in the controversy over the after- 
hours uses of the public schools. The struggle in Lamb's Chapel 
over access to the public schools raises profound questions 
about the purposes and uses of this aspect of the public sphere. 
The determination of what constraints may constitutionally be 
placed on the school's use triggers a First Amendment analysis 
which depends on an underlying conception of the public. 
The case implies a second layer of representation in public 
culture. In its petition in the case, Lamb's Chapel sought access 
to the public schools in order t o  show a six-part film series. 
According to the church's description of the film series, the 
films describe a "civil war of values."36 "[Tlhe film series 
would discuss . . . the undermining influences of the media that 
could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, 
Christian family values . . . ."37 The "culture war" is the 
struggle between secular humanism and religious morality over 
the control of public life, including control over mass media, 
public education, and the arts. The controversies include issues 
34. See Teitel, supra note 9. 
35. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (holding the application of a public school district 
rule barring use of school facilities for religious purposes to prohibit the after-hours 
showing of a religiously-centered film on family values to constitute viewpoint 
discrimination violative of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause). 
36. Id. at 2145 n.3. 
37. Id. at 2144. 
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about the nature of the family, sexual orientation, abortion, 
and p~rnography.~~ 
The controversy over the showing of the film at the public 
school, even after hours, constitutes a struggle over a potent 
symbol of public representation. For children, of course, the 
public schools and the cinema are the two leading constituent 
elements of their public sphere. A third may be the church. All 
appear and are interwoven in this case. 
Yet another layer of cultural representation is constituted 
by the Supreme Court's, opinion in the case. Justice Scalia's 
concurring opinion makes the most direct reference to the 
broader issues in the case, and to  the Court's role. Scalia's 
lighthearted concurrence expressly acknowledges the Court's 
own role as imagemaker in the public sphere. In a playful 
cinematic allusion to the film at stake in the merits, Scalia's 
opinion refers to the controlling separationist Establishment 
Clause precedent as "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie 
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad."3g 
Scalia plays with the Court's own role as imagemaker in the 
public sphere and characterizes the readers of the Court's 
opinion as "our audience."" The opinion's recognition of the 
public image, and of its readerlaudience is a rare 
acknowledgement of the Court as a representational aspect of 
the public sphere." 
The Court's recognition of its "audience" is a recognition 
that a judicial opinion's meaning is -interpreted in a 
relationship. The cinematic imagery is played up in the 
majority opinion's response to Scalia, with Justice White's 
majority opinion referring to  "Justice Scalia's evening at the 
cinema."" It is also an unusual acknowledgement the Court 
38. One segment of the film series, named The Family Under Fire, "views the 
family in the context of today's society where a civil war of values is being 
waged." Id. (emphasis added). For argument regarding the broader notion of a 
culture war in America for control of societal values, see JAMES D. HUNTER, 
CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE FAMILY, ART, EDUCATION, LAW, 
AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1992). 
39. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
40. Id at 2150. 
41. See id. ("The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I think, is that it is so 
easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so." 
(emphasis added)). 
42. Id. at 2148 n.7; see id. ("While we are somewhat diverted by Justice 
Scalia's evening at the cinema, we return to the reality that there is a proper way 
to inter an established decision and Lemon, however frightening it might be to 
some, has not been overruled." (citation omitted)). 
POSTMODERNIST ARCHITECTURES 
writes opinions not in a vacuum, but for an audience and in a 
context. 
The demand for equality in the representation of religious 
claims in public education can also be seen in two recent cases 
concerning graduation prayers in the public schools. In Lee v. 
Wei~man, '~  the Court evaluated a claim to equal 
representation of prayer at public school graduation. Jones v. 
Clear Creek Independent School ~istrict" focuses the question 
of equal recognition more clearly: Where there is little or no 
official involvement, may students elect to pray at public school 
graduation? In Clear Creek, what remains is the fusion of two 
compelling symbols: the public school children's prayers with 
the public school site, a constitutive element of the public 
sphere. 
The demand for equal recognition of religious claims is not 
only seen in litigation over access to  public education, but also 
in the struggle for public financial support for religious 
education. Some would distinguish these cases as seeking 
public support for private religious life, but more and more the 
cases cannot be accounted for in this way. I contend that the 
closest analogy to the "parochial aid" cases are emphatically 
not other funding cases, but rather all of the other litigation 
implicating access to public culture. Whether cases implying 
support in the way of particular monies or services for the 
teaching of religious values, what is at stake is expansion in 
the projection of religious values into the public realm. 
43. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). In Weisman, a majority held school officials had 
promoted school prayer in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause 
by drafting prayer guidelines and by choosing a cleric to deliver the graduation 
prayers. 
44. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). 
In its challenge in the Fifth Circuit, the American Civil Liberties Union argued 
that an offense to the First Amendment Establishment Clause lay in the 
majoritarian voting process by which the prayer decision was imposed on the 
nonpraying students who constituted a political minority and thus were losers in 
the process. 
This ACLU argument follows from the organization's broad philosophy that 
tonstitutional rights ought not be subject to  majority determination. But arguments 
based on process have their limitations-ultimately constitutional rights are in fact 
determined by a majority, even if by a supermajority. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V. 
Is CZeur Creek troubling because of the process? Doesn't the ACLU's emphasis 
on process suggest nothing remains at stake in the merits of the case? Appealing 
on grounds of process utterly evades the cultural significance of organized prayers 
held at the site of the public schools. If we consider this symbol of public culture 
as a tangible benefit, then we can begin to think about developing principles that 
might effectively protect juridical equality in the public sphere. 
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From a postmodernist architectural perspective, the cases 
are better understood as inversions. Rather than scaling the 
wall, the wall folds into itself to project religious values out 
into the public sphere. What appears to be the demand for 
public support for religion is simultaneously, and invertedly, 
also religious support for the norms of the public square. 
Examples of what I characterize as the privatelpublic 
inversion can be seen in recent church-state caselaw. In Zobrest 
v.  Catalina Foothills School ~istr ict :~ the constitutional 
question before the Court was whether the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause permits a public school district to  
provide a sign language interpreter for a student in a parochial 
school. Under the current doctrinal standard, the Court asks 
whether the interpreter's work advances religion. If so, it is 
violative of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Yet to 
what extent is it possible to  separate out religious and secular 
interpretation? Zobrest's establishment inquiry into the nature 
of the interpreter's work and into how it is interpreted is an 
elegant allusion to  a much broader problem about the role of 
constitutional law in defining the boundaries of religion in the 
public sphere? Under the Establishment Clause doctrine the 
45. 113 S. Ct. 2462, 61 U.S.L.W. 4641 (U.S. June 18, 1993). The Court, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist for the majority, attempts to analogize to welfare cases and not 
to the other Establishment Clause cases: "[Wle have consistently held that 
government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens 
defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment 
Clause challenge . . . ." Zobrest, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4643. By analogizing to funding 
precedent, the Court attempts to avoid the questions about the uses of the public 
sphere raised by this line of church-state cases. 
46. In Zobrest the majority attempts a formalist modernist approach in their 
characterization of the interpreter. 
[Tlhe task of a sign-language interpreter seems to us quite different from 
that of a teacher or guidance counselor. Notwithstanding the Court of 
Appeals' intimations to the contrary, the Establishment Clause lays down 
no absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school. 
Such a flat rule, smacking of antiquated notions of "taint," would indeed 
exalt form over substance. 
Id. at 4644 (citation and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
But the Zobrest dissenters see the distinction between provision of funds and 
provision of an employee as "not merely one of form." Id. at 4647 (Blackmun, J., 
joined by Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Souter say "this distinction 
between the provision of funds and the provision of a human being is not merely 
one of form. It goes to the heart of the principles animating the Establishment 
Clause." Id. 
"[Tlhe graphic symbol of the concert of church and state that results when a 
public employee . . . mouths a religious message." Id. "Our cases make clear that 
government crosses the boundary when it furnishes the medium for communication 
971 POSTMODERNIST ARCHITECTURES 111 
relevant question is whether a challenged governmental 
activity is interpreted as religious or secular. Yet if one were to 
apply a principle of equal representation, might applying such 
a principle even imply a mandate of equal recognition of 
religious claims? How would this be achieved? How can an 
equality-of-representation outcome be achieved? 
Parents Assh v. Quinones4' and Grumet v. Board of 
 ducati ion^^ raise the question of religious values on public 
school grounds or in public transportation and illuminate how 
the question of public support for religious schools is inverted 
and might alternatively be understood as a question about the 
extent of representation of religious norms in the public sphere. 
In Grumet, New York's Court of Appeals analyzed the problem 
of the creation of a public school district exactly coterminous 
with a religious enclave. Perhaps the proposal can be 
conceptualized as a phony, a private, a paper public square:' 
Another area of current controversy in public education, 
with a spillover into popular culture more broadly, is over 
control of the content of the public school curriculum. The call 
for the "rainbow curriculum" evinces the "equal representation" 
approach. The "rainbow curriculum" controversy has largely 
been waged relating to race, ethnicity, and gender claims." 
Nevertheless, the earliest church-state litigation over equal 
representation in the public school curriculum implicated 
religious claims. For example, McCollum v. Board of Education 
rejected an equal access argument, grounded in pluralism, for 
religious education classes in the public schoolss1; the more 
recent challenges to the curriculum include the demands for 
of a religious message." Id. 
47. 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding unconstitutional the creation of a 
wall to support female Hasidic students in public school under the aegis of a 
federally funded remedial education program). 
48. No. 120, 1993 WL 241389 (N.Y. July 6, 1993), affg 592 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992) (holding unconstitutional as First Amendment establishment a New 
York statute creating a public school district coterminous with a religious enclave 
in order to provide handicapped school children with special public services). "We 
conclude that this symbolic union of church and state effected by the establishment 
of the . . . school district under [the challenged statute] is sufficiently likely to be 
perceived . . . as an endorsement . . . or . . . as a disapproval . . . ." Id. at *12. 
49. But the court pierced through the proposed square: "Thus, only Hasidic 
children will attend the public schools in the newly established school district, and 
only members of the Hasidic sect will likely serve on the school board." Id. at *12. 
50. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Sobol, No. 3324-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany 
County filed July 23, 1993) (pending challenge to New York "rainbow curriculum.") 
51. See Illinois a rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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equal recognition of "creationism science."52 
How ought America's religious pluralism be represented in 
public life? Beyond public education, other contemporary 
controversies over the public sphere concern public displays 
and parades. In  two public religious symbol display cases, the 
Eleventh and Sixth Circuits held in diverging directions, a 
conflict likely to lead to Supreme Court dispo~ition?~ 
Another i l lus t ra t ion of t h e  s t ruggle  for equal  
representation in the public sphere is the controversy over 
holiday parades-in particular St. Patrick's Day parades. As in 
the curriculum debates, these controversies pit gay-rights 
groups against religious groups. The arguments in recent 
litigation over the New York parade are illustrative. The 
Ancient Order of Hibernians argued that the parade constitutes 
private religious expression even though it implies a public 
display. Conversely, the city argued the parade is an official 
display, and that therefore the municipality may properly 
select parade participants whose ideals align with the 
principles of non-dis~rimination.~~ Neither argument nor 
characterization fully accounts for the nature of the parade. 
The pursuit of public display space relating to race and religion 
claims attests to a vital power struggle over equality of 
representation in the public square. 
Controversies over religious representation are still 
conceived as questions concerning First Amendment freedom of 
speech.55 The judicial approach continues to adhere to a 
modernist perspective which attempts to shore up an 
increasingly thin line between private and public spheres. The 
First Amendment speech doctrine inquires about the nature 
52. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down Arkansas 
statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution). 
53. In Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 976 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g 
granted and opinion vacated, 988 F.2d 1563 (1993), the Eleventh Circuit held 
unconstitutional the display of a large menorah at  a state capitol, while in 
Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, No. 92-4016, 1993 WL 243782 (6th 
Cir. July 8, 1993), the Sixth Circuit upheld the display of a menorah in a 
comparable public space. In Cincinnati, a district court allowed an eighteen-foot 
menorah to be displayed at a municipal public square. This holiday display was 
followed by a Klan display of a ten-foot cross at  the square. The Klan display 
prompted substantial unrest, leading to calls to close the forum. Id. at *l. 
54. Right Parade Ruling, Wrong Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at A20. 
55. The New York Civil Liberties Union offers the Solomonic remedy of two 
parades. What the "two parade" or "more speech" alternative neatly evades is any 
consideration of the significance of the public recognition of the Saint Patrick's Day 
parade. 
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and characteristics of the forum: is it public, private, or 
limited?56 The doctrine of the forum is thought to offer a 
neutral principle, but it is difficult to imagine how a doctrine 
dependent on the characterization of the forum can be 
considered freestanding from the question of how we envision 
our religious landscape. 
Under a public-forum analysis, the question the Court asks 
is: What use did the government previously allow within this 
space? Past use determines future use. Under the forum 
doctrine, if there has been a past religious use, the government 
may not discriminate against the present claim. But what does 
this analysis imply? Reliance on the forum analysis implies 
that where there has not been a past religious use, there 
cannot be a present religious use. Yet perhaps the government 
does not conceive of the past use as a "religious use." This 
doctrine of the forum is a powerfully conservative principle; in  
protecting the status quo, it  excludes those seeking new access 
to public culture. Such use of the current First Amendment 
doctrine analysis imposes a disparate impact on religious 
minorities. 
Controversies over the representation of religion in public 
culture illuminate the Court's struggle over the breakdown of 
the Enlightenment distinction between the private and public 
spheres. Something is a t  stake the modernist framework is not 
able to encompass. To what extent can our ever-increasing 
pluralism be equally represented? And if it cannot be, what are 
the implications for our conception and delineation of the public 
sphere? 
Let us return to the postmodernist paradox, for it offers yet 
another perspective on representation. An alternative to the 
search for equality of pluralist religious representations is the 
search for universal religious culture. These syncretic 
representations graphically evince the breakdown in the 
modernist distinction between the sacred and the secular5' 
V. POSTMODERNIST PARADOXES: 
PLURALISM AND THE GLOBAL RELIGION 
Let me turn now to illustrate the other side of the 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
57. I introduce the term "syncretic representations" in a longer piece on this 
development. See Teitel, supra note 9. 
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paradoxical postmodernist look of religion in the public sphere. 
Again, my illustrations derive from the Establishment Clause 
caselaw. Lynch v. Donnelly was the first Supreme Court 
decision to address the constitutionality of a public holiday 
symbol display. When it came down, Lynch was heavily 
criticized for upholding a Nativity display as secular because it 
was displayed in the context of other symbols, such as wishing 
wells, reindeer, and Santa C l a ~ s . ~ '  Yet the Lynch display well 
illustrates the postmodemist look of American religion today: 
pastiche, kitsch, hodge-podge, a n  eclectic and  rich 
amalgamation of the sacred and the profane. 
The breakdown in the categories of law and religion can 
also be seen in judicial consideration of public school 
graduation prayer. Lee v. Weismanss illustrates how American 
religion has changed partly in response to constitutional law. 
To deconstruct the graduation prayer in Weisman is to reveal 
a n  intricate composite of theological, political and  
constitutional motifs.60 The constitutional law of religion 
implies the deconstruction and recombination of the sacred and 
the secular, of prayer and of constitutional law in a new hybrid 
transmutation of both. 
Another illustration of the new religion is the curricula in 
the public schools. Rather than a traditional teaching of the 
three American religious holidays, there has been movement to 
a shared winter holiday of Christmas, Hanukkah, and Kwanza, 
representing a fusion of traditions. The new global religion at 
one level offers a way to equally represent religious diversity in 
public life. But the fusion also incorporates the motif of the 
law, and of constitutional law in particular. 
There has long been American "civil religion.'"' 
58. Lynch v. Domelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
59. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
60. The text of the graduation prayer at issue in Weisman illustrates the fusion 
of the religious and the secular-legal; that fusion has become "traditionaln in 
American civil religion and is emblematic of postmodernism. T o r  the legacy of 
America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, 
we thank You . . . . For the political process of America in which all its citizens 
may participate, for its court -system where all may seek justice we thank You." 
Id. at 2652. 
For a thoughtful discussion of the fusion of religion and constitutional law in 
American culture, see S ~ R D  LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
61. See Robert Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in CULTURE AND SOCIm, 
supra note 2, at 262, 262 ("few have realized that there actually exists alongside of 
and rather clearly differentiated from the churches an elaborate and well- 
institutionalized civil religion in American). 
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Traditional American civil religion was used to serve political 
purposes. But the new postmodernist religion appears to be 
more of a transformation. Postmodernism's global religion 
presents a much greater challenge to traditional religion as we 
know it. I t  may ultimately be a question of accepting that we 
are post-Enlightenment religion and that both religion and law 
are changing a t  the same time, and also have a symbiotic 
impact on each other. 
The controversies here discussed raise the question of 
whether there are principles available to govern religion in  
public life. The postmodernist paradox offers diverging 
directions, of pluralist and universalist representations, and 
the law of the Religion Clauses paves the path for change. Yet 
the question of which metaphor represents religion in the 
public sphere-wall or public square-implies first a conception 
of the look of a desirable religious landscape. 
This Essay began by addressing the current changes in the 
language of our church-state jurisprudence. Analysis of that  
language tells us of a breakdown in the separation between 
private and public spheres and between religious culture and 
law. This is the point from which new theorizing about the 
constitutional law of religion ought to begin. 
